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Abstract 
 
To understand the executive demands of the FB task relative to an alternative theory-of-mind 
(or mechanical causality) task, picture sequencing, the present study used path analyses. 166 
children between 3 to 6 years old completed the FB and picture sequencing tasks, three 
executive function tasks (updating, inhibition and shifting) and receptive language. The 
model with the best fit indicated that FB performance entailed a direct contribution from 
shifting of attention and inhibitory control, which was independent of the significant 
contribution made by picture sequencing. This model clearly indicates that FB inference 
requires more executive processing than picture sequencing, which is used as an alternative 
task to measure theory-of-mind.  
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A long-standing debate has surrounded how best to explain children’s developing ability 
to pass a test of false belief, such as the unexpected transfer test in which child participants 
are asked to predict where a protagonist will search for a coveted object (Wimmer & Perner, 
1983). If children predict that the protagonist will look in the place s/he last saw the object, 
they are credited with an understanding of false belief in that they apparently individuate 
between what they know is true (the object is in Location A) and what they think the 
protagonist believes is true (s/he falsely believes the object is in Location B). Some 
researchers argued that development is driven by children acquiring a concept of belief at 
about 4 years of age (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; Perner, 1991; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 
2001). In contrast, some researchers argued that children already possess a concept of belief 
by 4 years of age but still give the ‘wrong answer’ in an unexpected transfer test due to 
various task demands apart from those relevant to having a concept of belief (Lewis & 
Osborne, 1990; Mitchell & Lacohée, 1991; Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe, & Tidswell, 1991; 
Siegal & Beattie, 1991). Specifically, Russell et al were the first to suggest that young 
children might err not because they have difficulty with the concept of belief but primarily 
because of the executive demands of the unexpected transfer test; these authors suggested 
that developing an ability to pass an unexpected transfer test depends on the maturation of 
executive processes that the task draws upon.  
Bloom and German (2000) went as far as suggesting that the unexpected transfer test is 
not fit for the purpose of investigating development of a ‘theory of mind’; at the very least, 
they suggested, a priority is to understand what kind of demands are imposed by the 
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unexpected transfer test (apart from those demands that draw upon the child’s concept of 
belief). The purpose of the current research was to begin to address this question by testing 
children on a variety of tests of executive processing in addition to an unexpected transfer test. 
The aim was to generate a statistical model that would optimally explain variance in 
performance data associated with the unexpected transfer test and an alternative measure that 
also putatively taps into the child’s understanding of inner states. 
To understand the cognitive demand of the false-belief task, defining sources of 
information that a participant processes during the task is important. Achim, Guitton, Jackson, 
Boutin, and Monetta (2013) outlined the 8 sources of information framework (8-SIF) to 
characterize tasks that are currently available for a mentalising judgment. According to the 
framework, mentalising tasks can involve information for agents and for contexts. Both types 
of information can be drawn immediately from a given task or from a person’s memory, or 
from both. The immediate information for the agent and for the context can be presented by 
perceptual and linguistic means. The information drawn from a person’s memory of the agent 
and of the context includes specific or general information. Specific information includes the 
details that the participants already know about the protagonist’s characteristics as well as the 
surrounding environment related to the task, whereas general information refers to general 
knowledge about people and contexts (e.g. different categories of people and situations that 
can lead to certain assumptions), which the participants can recall and use spontaneously. 
Achim et al. suggest that these sources of information could contribute to, and influence, the 
accuracy of mentalising judgments.  
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A classic false-belief task involves a verbal presentation of a scenario with a puppet 
enactment in which a protagonist (i.e. the puppet) comes to hold a false-belief about the 
location of an object due to the unexpected transfer of that object. In this task, participants are 
required to process the perceptual and linguistic information in the story (immediate 
information) and then they need to access social knowledge about what people would 
normally do in a case of the unexpected transfer of an object (stored information) to make a 
correct judgment.   
The picture-sequencing task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1986) is another type of task 
intended to assess children’s mentalising ability (Achim et al., 2013). In this task, participants 
are asked to rearrange four snapshots of an event into sequential order such that it is coherent 
in relation to an agent’s mental states, including their false-beliefs. This task is a good point 
of comparison for an unexpected transfer task because it imposes different processing 
demands while still tapping into the child’s understanding that others can hold false beliefs. 
According to the 8 sources of information framework (8-SIF) by Achim et al. (2013), these 
two tasks (false belief and picture sequencing) impose similar processing demands except for 
one major difference. Both tasks include the sources of information drawn from memory for 
the general assumptions about the agent and for the context but do not include specific 
information for the agent or the context. However, these tasks differ in that uniquely for the 
false belief, task the immediate information for the agent and for the context is presented 
using both perceptual and linguistic modalities, whereas no immediate linguistic information 
is available for the picture-sequencing task. In summary, a false-belief task requires 
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participants to engage in the dual tasks of processing two different sources of information, 
which would place an extra cognitive load on participants when processing linguistic 
information; this extra load is absent from the picture-sequencing task. 
When characterising mentalising based on the 8-SIF, it becomes clear that tackling a 
false-belief task requires processing two sources of information simultaneously. Thus to 
make a correct mentalising judgment in a false-belief task, children would need to have 
sufficient executive processing capacity. Even adults are reported to find the cognitive load 
challenging in a false-belief task. In their study of implicit false-belief processing, Schneider, 
Lam, Bayliss, and Dux (2012) found that adult participants who were subject to the dual-task 
condition failed to track the false-location based on a protagonist’s false belief, whereas those 
who were under the no-load condition correctly tracked the false-location. This result 
suggests that mentalising at the implicit level is also disrupted when extra cognitive-load 
associated with an unexpected transfer test is applied.  
To cope with the cognitive-load in the context of unexpected transfer, certain levels of 
executive processes may be required. Development of Executive functions (EFs) has become 
one of the foci in the discussion of how children acquire their capacity to exercise 
mentalising judgments in the FB task. EF encompasses a wide range of abilities such as 
working memory (updating), inhibitory control (inhibition) and cognitive flexibility (shifting), 
and provides the foundation for reflective thinking, reasoning and self-control of behaviours 
(Blair, 2016; Zelazo et al., 2013). When engaged in most cognitive tasks, at least some of 
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these functions are at work, although the exact role of these functions for mentalising is not 
yet clear.  
Most studies that examine the role of executive processes in mentalising use some of the 
components of EF to measure this capacity. However, there is lack of consensus on the exact 
causal relationships between EFs and ToM. This may be due to the lack of a clear operational 
definition of EF (Barkley, 2012), which has led to a variability of tasks employed in various 
studies, and to methodological issues including a low level of internal-consistency and 
retesting reliability across EF tasks (van der Ven, Kroesbergen, Boom, & Leseman, 2013). 
The findings from a recent meta-analysis suggest a weak to moderate association between 
executive processing capacity and false belief judgment across different cultural contexts 
(Devine & Hughes, 2014).  
As for the exact role of EFs in false-belief judgments, Devine and Hughes support a 
hybrid emergence-expression hypothesis, which is derived from both the emergence account 
that EFs play a functional role in the conceptual development of false-belief judgment 
(Russell, 1996) and the expression account that false-belief tasks place incidental demands on 
EFs (Russell et al., 1991). In an effort to tease out a pure incidental task demand in 
false-belief judgment, several studies (Carlson, Claxton, & Moses, 2015; Perner, Lang, & 
Kloo, 2002) used modified tasks such as the ‘think-know’ task (Moore, Pure, & Furrow, 
1990) and the explanation task (Robinson & Mitchell, 1995) that have different degrees of 
cognitive demands. These authors found relationships between EFs and a modified version of 
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mentalising judgments, which seemed to support the emergence account. However, 
irrespective of the degree of conceptual difficulty in tasks, all the tasks are akin to a classic 
form of false-belief context, where the sources of information are concerned. On the 
8-SIF(Achim et al., 2013), these tasks require processing of immediate information conveyed 
through both a linguistic and a perceptual channel. In this respect, even conceptually easier 
tasks may still require a certain level of executive processing, which led to the identification 
of significant relationships between EFs and these modified tasks. Thus it is unclear that 
these observed relationships are due to common demand derived from conceptual overlap or 
cognitive-load. 
The picture-sequencing task, which requires participants to process perceptual 
information, is likely to have a different role in the relationship with EFs if the cognitive-load 
in executive processing is lower than in false-belief tasks. To clarify this relationship, the 
present study uses the EF tasks to measure working memory (updating), inhibitory control 
(inhibition) and cognitive flexibility (shifting the focus of attention) and to examine the 
degree to which each measure contributes to cognitive processing in the picture-sequencing 
task and in judging false belief.  
As argued by Bloom and German (2000), if a FB task is more cognitively demanding 
than another kind of mentalising task, then we could find different relationships between the 
false-belief and picture-sequencing tasks. To examine these relationships, the present study 
conducted path analyses of the following two models. The first model is a non-recursive 
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model in that both the FB and picture-sequencing tasks are set as endogenous variables with a 
feedback loop between them. The relationship between these endogenous variables and the 
exogenous variables of EFs, receptive language and age are examined. The second model is 
recursive in that a path is only drawn from picture-sequencing to false-belief according to the 
assumption that false-belief is measuring more than mentalising (Bloom & German, 2000). 
The magnitude of the direct effects from EFs and receptive language and age, as well as 
indirect effects from these variables via the picture-sequencing task was examined.  
We predict that a false-belief task, which requires more cognitive-load in processing 
sources of information, is likely to place more demands on the EFs of inhibitory control and 
shifting components than a picture-sequencing task.  
Method 
Participants.  
One-hundred-and-sixty-six children (94 boys) between 3 and 6 years old (M age = 5;0, 
SD = .86, range 3;5 – 6;5) participated in this study. They were from a catchment area of 
middle to lower-middle class communities located on the outskirts of Osaka city. Ethical 
approval was granted by the author’s academic institution and written informed consents 
were obtained from the parents of the participants. 
Design and Materials.  
 10 
Mentalising abilities were assessed using picture-sequencing and false-belief tasks. 
Executive functions (EFs) were assessed using the pointing-stroop task (Berger, Jones, 
Rothbart, & Posner, 2000), the Dimension Change Card Sorting (DCCS) task (Zelazo, 2006), 
and the Digit span task. Receptive language was assessed using a Japanese version of the 
PVT (Ueno, Nakoshi, & Onuki, 2008). 
Picture-sequencing task.  
Four pictures, depicting scenes that represented an event involving causality or mental 
states, were presented to the children. The children were asked to put them in order to make a 
story. Four sets of task stimuli were chosen from the picture sequencing test (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1986). These included two sets for causality events: a person causally interacting with an 
object and an object causally interacting with an object (mechanical condition in the original 
study); and two sets of stimuli involving the attribution of people’s mental states for a 
missing teddy bear and a missing bar of chocolate (intentional condition). The children’s 
ability to represent events was assessed based on the correct sequencing of pictures to make 
the story. The scoring system used by the original study was followed. 
Executive function (EF) tasks.  
The Pointing-stroop task (Berger et al., 2000) and Dimension Change Card Sorting 
(DCCS) task (Zelazo, 2006) were presented to the participants on a computer with a touch 
panel screen. The Digit span task that measured working memory (WM) was administered 
manually. The order of administering the tasks was counterbalanced. 
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Pointing-Stroop task.  
This task was based on Berger et al. (2000) and comprises three blocks: practice (2 trials), 
compatibility (8 trials), and incompatibility (8 trials). The sequence of stimuli presentation is 
shown in Figure 1. The trial was started by touching a ‘focal point’ on the screen which 
initiated the display of cat and dog pictures with simultaneous audio presentations of the 
animal sound “meow”/ “woof”. No inter-stimuli intervals were included so that the child 
could initiate the next trial when s/he was ready. For scoring, accuracy was used (number of 
correct responses in incompatibility trials). Speed of response was not used as it was found 
not to be reliable in a previous study (van der Ven et al., 2013). 
[Figure1] 
Dimensional Change Card Sorting (DCCS) task. 
This task was developed from the original manual presentation of DCCS (Zelazo, 2006). 
The children’s correct responses after introducing a new sorting rule was measured. The trial 
sequence of stimuli presentation is shown in Figure 2. A block of two practice trials, which 
was repeated until the child understood the task, preceded the pre-switch block (6 trials) and 
the post-switch block (6 trials). The task was initiated by touching a “star”, which caused the 
target card to be shown below the fixed picture cards. When the child touched one of the 
pictures (hat or bag) a sound was made to acknowledge the action regardless of accuracy. 
The child initiated the next trial when s/he was ready by touching the focal point on the 
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screen. For scoring, accuracy (number of correct responses for the post-switch condition) was 
used.   
[Figure2] 
Digit span task 
Following the instructions of KABC (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004), a series of digits 
were presented to the child orally. The child needed to repeat back the digits to the 
experimenter in a forward order.  
False-belief (FB) tasks  
Two unexpected transfer tasks (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 
1983) in which a protagonist holds a false-belief about the location of an object were used to 
measure theory-of-mind ability. Each task included a memory question for the initial location 
of the item, a reality question for the present location of the item and a false-belief question 
for the protagonist’s belief about the location of the item. All three questions had to be 
answered correctly to pass the task. 
Procedures.  
Children were tested individually in a quiet room in one session, which lasted 25 to 30 
minutes. The order of the tasks was counterbalanced with the exception of the PVT, which 
was always administered last because the duration of this task varies dramatically depending 
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on the individual’s language ability and this may have had an effect on the child’s motivation 
for any subsequent tasks. 
Results 
Descriptive statistics for all the measures are summarised in Table 1. There was no 
gender difference except for DCCS in which girls scored higher than boys: t(164) = 3.23, 
two-tailed p < .001. Cohen’s d = .51.  
[Table1] 
For the picture-sequencing task, separate one-way ANOVAs on the scores for the 
domains of mechanical and intentional picture sequencing were conducted. The children’s 
scores increased with age for both domains: Welch’s F (3, 83.10) = 31.50, p < .001, ω2 
＝ .36 for the mechanical domain; and Welch’s F (3, 83.60) = 28.50, p < .001, ω2 ＝ .33 for 
the intentional domain. Games-Howell post hoc tests (a prior alpha level was set at .05) 
suggest that most groups differed from one another with older groups performing 
significantly better than younger groups (ps < .01), with the exception of mechanical domain 
for the 3 and 4 year-old groups (p = .19), and for the 5 and 6 year-old groups (p =.052). The 
intentional domain also showed a similar trend (ps <.05) with the exception of the 5 and 6 
year-old group (p = .077).  
For executive functions (EFs), separate one-way ANOVAs were conducted with Stroop, 
DCCS and WM as dependent variables. Stroop differed with age: Welch’s F (3, 79.30) = 
11.80, p < .001, ω2 ＝ .16. Games-Howell post hoc tests suggest that significant 
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improvements were observed between 3 year-olds and 5 & 6 year-olds, and also between 4 
year-olds and 6 year-olds: ps < .01. DCCS differed with age: Welch’s F (3, 80.00) = 10.76, p 
< .001, ω2 ＝ .15. Games-Howell post hoc tests suggest significant improvements between 3 
& 4 year-olds and 5 & 6 year-old groups: ps < .05. WM differed with age: Welch’s F (3, 
82.53) = 12.39, p < .001, ω2 ＝ .17. Games-Howell post hoc tests suggest significant 
improvements between 3 & 4 year-olds and 5 & 6 year-old groups: ps < .05.  
For false-beliefs, a one-way ANOVA indicated a significant increase in the children’s 
performance between age groups: Welch’s F (3, 86.31) = 38.88 , p < .001 , ω2 ＝.41. The 
Games-Howell post hoc tests suggested significant improvements in scores between all age 
groups (p < .03) with the exception of the 5 and 6 year-old groups (p = .38). 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients between the measurements are summarised in Table 2. 
All the variables interrelated positively with a moderate to strong degree of association. The 
largest correlation in the table, excluding PVT and age, is between the intentional and 
mechanical domains in the picture-sequencing task. This is greater than the correlation 
between the intentional picture sequencing and FB, which are supposedly within the same 
domain for the measurement of mentalising ability. Therefore, based on these data, it is 
possible that intentional and mechanical domains measure the same thing, suggesting that the 
boundary between intentional and mechanical is spurious in this particular case. 
[Table2] 
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Path analysis for the FB task and the picture sequencing task as endogenous variables with 
executive functions and receptive language as exogenous variables 
To examine how performance measured by the FB and the picture-sequencing tasks 
was related to executive functions (EFs) and receptive language, path analyses using AMOS 
with maximum-likelihood estimation1 were conducted. Two components 
(intentional/mechanical) for the picture-sequencing task correlated significantly each other 
(see Table 2), and inter task-item analysis found no justification for separating these variables 
of picture sequencing into component parts. Thus, these scores were combined to make a 
single measurement (see Supporting information 1). A total score for the FB and the 
picture-sequencing task were respectively set as endogenous variables while WM, Stroop, 
DCCS, receptive language and age were set as exogenous variables for each of the two 
possible model options: recursive and non-recursive. The analysis of the non-recursive model 
revealed that the feedback loop between endogenous variables did not converge. A path was 
found from picture sequencing to FB in the recursive model.  
The initial recursive model that included WM did not have a good fit and WM did not 
have any significant effects on either of the endogenous variables. Thus another model that 
excluded the paths from WM was considered. This model indicated a lower ACI than the 
previous model with a better model fit: X2 (2) = .72, p = .70, AGFI = .98, RMSEA < .0001, 
AIC = 52.72. In this model, a path from the DCCS task to the picture-sequencing task was 
 
1 univariate distributions were within the recommended ranges for skewness < 2 and kurtosis < 7 
(West, Finch, & Curran, P. J. ,1995)  
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not significant and thus was removed. The final model had an improved model-fit index, 
which had a lower value of AIC: X2 (3) = 1.95, p = .58, AGFI = .97, RMSEA < .0001, AIC = 
51.95. 
This model also had better fit than the other model, including gender: X2 (6) = 8.87, p = .18, 
AGFI = .86, RMSEA = .54, AIC =103.87. This final model is shown in Figure 3. For picture 
sequencing performance, in addition to age (b = .43) and receptive language (b = .25), Stroop 
(b = .17) made a significant contribution, explaining 51% of the variance. This 
picture-sequencing task (b = .28) made a significant contribution to FB, with additional 
unique and significant contributions from receptive language (b = .19), Stroop (b =.21) and 
DCCS (b =.15), explaining a total of 52% of variance in FB. Age did not make a unique or 
significant contribution to FB. When the picture-sequencing scores for only the intentional 
trials were used then this gave similar results for model fit index: X2 (3) = 1.94, p = .59, 





The present study compared two tasks, false-belief and picture sequencing, and their 
relationships to executive functions (EFs) and receptive language. The model that included a 
path drawn from the picture-sequencing task to the FB task gave the best fit to the data; it 
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modelled the relationship between these two tasks together with other exogenous variables. 
In this model, age, receptive language and Stroop (inhibition) were significant contributors to 
the picture-sequencing task, explaining 51% of variance. However, the executive functions of 
DCCS (shifting) and WM (updating) did not make significant contributions to the 
picture-sequencing task. The picture-sequencing task subsequently contributed to the FB task, 
with independent contributions from EFs (Stroop and DCCS), age and receptive language, 
accounting for 54% of the variance. These results suggest that FB performance could be 
explained by additional unique variance in DCCS and Stroop in addition to the picture 
sequencing task; this supports the claim by Bloom and German (2000) that the FB task 
measures more than just mentalising ability. Another way of interpreting the data would be 
that the FB task more strongly draws upon executive processes than does the picture 
sequencing task, irrespective of whether or not that task has intentional content. 
For the EFs, the DCCS task was used to measure the flexible shifting of the focus of 
attention, whereas the Stroop task was used to measure inhibitory control. Additional 
variance in both inhibitory control and shifting of the focus of attention were needed to pass 
the FB task, suggesting that these two functions appeared to be key elements that are required 
to pass the FB task. Although, the flexible shifting of the focus of attention as measured by 
the DCCS task seems to be critical for passing the FB task, it is not essential for the 
picture-sequencing task. In contrast, inhibitory control as measured by the pointing-stroop 
task appeared to contribute to both tasks (FB and picture sequencing). Thus, some forms of 
inhibitory control are likely to be involved in responding to the general executive demands of 
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both tasks. This interpretation accords with the claim that relationships between 
theory-of-mind and executive function tasks are attributable to more than just a common 
problem of inhibitory control, and that different aspects of EFs are needed to explain their 
developmental relationships (Perner et al., 2002). The executive function tasks in the present 
study were Stroop (inhibitory control) and DCCS (shifting the focus of attention), which 
were administered using an analogous format of touching a PC screen. Therefore it is 
unlikely that differential effects of DCCS and Stroop on the FB and picture sequencing tasks 
derived from any procedural differences.   
With respect to the 8 sources of information framework: 8-SIF (Achim et al., 2013), the 
false-belief task includes additional linguistic sources of information for the agent and for the 
context. Extra linguistic information included in the FB task may be helpful in guiding the 
participants to impute the agent’s mental states. However, this source of information could 
come at a cost because of the linguistic information about the changes in the context resulting 
from a translocation of the object. It could inadvertently direct the participants’ attention to 
the more salient (the true belief) location rather than the agent’s (false) belief, without a 
volitional flexible shift of attention. Thus the participants may require an important shift in 
the focus of attention from the context they hear last. Unique variance in inhibitory control 
and shift of attention that help explain the FB scores in the model support this interpretation. 
These findings suggest that a higher level of EFs is necessary to pass the FB task than to pass 
picture sequencing.   
 19 
Is it possible that the extra linguistic information given in the false-belief task could 
cause the participants to incorrectly impute the mental states of the agent? When the FB task 
is given without a verbal scenario to young children (Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007), they 
performed well. In such a nonverbal FB task, the participants do not need to process 
linguistic information and therefore do not need to make an effortful shift in the focus of 
attention that may be required in the verbal FB task. Under such circumstances, the younger 
children were imputing the agent’s mental state without interference from linguistic 
information. When verbal processing is involved, however, the linguistic representation could 
make it harder for the participants to shift their focus of attention to the original (falsely 
believed) location. Previous findings from adult participants whose implicit false-belief 
inferences were negatively affected by just listening to unrelated linguistic information 
(Schneider et al., 2012) raise the possibility that even a low-level of cognitive load could 
degrade a participants’ performance. 
In terms of the relationship with receptive language, both the false-belief and 
picture-sequencing tasks shared a similar degree of variance with linguistic competence. 
These results suggest that language is an important factor (Astington & Jenkins, 1999), even 
though the picture-sequencing task did not include a linguistic source of information. The 
picture-sequencing task is likely to require self-guided linguistic representations in order to 
interpret perceptual information and to construct a causal or intentional event that makes 
sense in the physical and social world.      
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The emerging picture for the FB task has important implications for the interpretation of 
existing studies in regard to the development of mentalising. For the relationship between 
executive functions (EFs) and theory of mind (ToM), EFs seems to be critical when 
mentalising ability is measured using FB tasks, whereas there is no clear relationship when 
other mentalising tasks are used, such as the intentional version of the picture-sequencing 
task. More precisely, the source of information included in mentalising seems to account for 
the possibility of finding a relationship between EFs and ToM. Differences in cognitive load 
in mentalising tasks, such as inclusion (high-load) or exclusion (low-load) of false belief, did 
not change their relationships with EFs (Carlson et al., 2015). Although cognitive load was 
manipulated, the tasks used by Carlson, Claxton and Moses (2015) use both linguistic and 
perceptual information, and are similar to each other with respect to the source of information 
based on 8-SIF (Achim et al., 2013). This seems to suggest that analyses of the tasks in terms 
of the sources of information are important when making a relevant selection of mentalising 
tasks.  
This argument resonates with the present finding of a close association between the 
intentional and mechanical versions of the picture-sequencing task. From the original study 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1986), intentional and causality versions of the picture-sequencing task 
were expected to elicit different levels of performance in children. Baron-Cohen et al. (1986) 
depicted atypical characteristics of mentalising ability in ASD children in comparison with 
typically developing children. However, it was not clear how typically developing children 
performed differently in the intentional and mechanical versions of the task. The present 
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study found that task differences in the contents (intentional/ mechanical) may be very subtle 
when compared with the robustness of the executive processing required by the 
characteristics of the picture-sequencing task. Thus processing the sources of information in 
the picture-sequencing task is similar for intentional and mechanical versions, and differences 
in content had little impact on performance.   
Conclusion 
The false-belief (FB) task has been used in a large number of studies that investigate the 
development of theory of mind (ToM), and has almost become a signature task for the 
measurement of this ability. However, the path analyses in this study that examined the 
relationship between the FB task, the picture-sequencing task and executive functions 
suggests that passing the FB task requires considerably more than just mentalising ability, as 
claimed by Bloom and German (2000). Assessing the development of mentalising abilities 
(ToM) with a variety of mentalising tasks, giving due consideration to the source of 
information, could provide a better approach to understanding the development of this ability.    
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics by age 
Age groups   3-year   4-year   5-year   6-year   Total 
Age  
 
n = 30   n = 47   n = 54   n = 35   n =166 
 











Picture sequencing         
   
  
 
Mechanical M  1.17   1.85   3.02 
 
 3.63   2.48 
 
(0-4) SD  1.34   1.60   1.37 
 
  .84   1.61 
 
Intentional  M  1.17   2.00   2.98 
 
 3.57   2.50 
  (0-4) SD  1.23   1.49   1.30    .98   1.53 
Executive functions 
          
 
Stroop M  4.17   5.83   7.07   7.54   6.30 
 
(0-8) SD  3.30   2.88   2.04   1.29   2.71 
 
DCCS M  2.67   3.60   4.91   5.23   4.20 
 
(0-6) SD  2.50   2.40   1.78   1.61   2.28 
 
WM M  7.83   7.85   9.37   10.06   8.81 
 
(0-15) SD  2.39   2.21   2.31   1.53   2.33 
False-beliefs                 
 
(0-2) M   .17    .94   1.44   1.66   1.11 
 28 
  
SD   .53    .89   .82    .73    .93 
PVT                 
   (3-60) M 12.40   16.15   23.81   31.09   21.11 
  
 
SD  7.87   7.21   10.38   10.71   11.31 
Note. Ranges are indicated in parenthesis 
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Table 2. Pearson’s correlation coefficients between the measurements and age 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Age - 
      
2. PVT .62** - 
     
3. WM .43** .56** - 
    
4. Stroop .45** .49** .37** - 
   
5. DCCS .45** .46** .40** .53** - 
  
6. Mechanical  .59** .54** .39** .44** .38** - 
 
7. Intentional  .59** .53** .39** .43** .41** .61** - 
8. False-belief .56** .59** .41** .56** .52** .58** .55** 
 
